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Abstract. Refugees have been ubiquitous in recent cases of international intervention. But, to
what extent do refugees serve as the rationale to intervene? Do refugee flows legitimate inter-
vention? To answer such questions, principal cases of recent ItN interventions are examined
including Northern Iraq (to protect the Kurds), Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Rwanda. Substantial
evidence is found in UN resolutions and related documents to infer a trend towards greater
consideration of refugees when deciding about intervention. Yet, such consideration is less
'humanitarian' than security-focused. That refugees pose threats to others, not solely or princi-
pally their own suffering, continues to dominate multilateral decisions to intervene.
Introduction
ln 1979, there were 4.6 million refugees worldwide. Just fifteen years later,
by early 1994,that figured climbed to a peak of 18.2 million. Twenty-four
million persons were also displaced and scattered internally among many
conflict zones. That is, one out of every 130 people in the world was dis-
placed as a result of persecution, violence or natural disaster. In the following
three years, the number of refugees declined somewhat to 13.2 million as a
consequence of repatriation after conflicts in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia,
and Mozambique had ceased. At the same time, however, those who had
been internally displaced rose to about 30 million.t Such displaced persons fled
human rights abuses, ethnic conflict, and generalized violence. In addition,
there are many others who have left their home voluntarily in search of work
or basic subsistence.2 The UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimates
that there are 25-30 million legal labor immigrants. In addition, there are
probably 20-40 million illegal labor immigrants.
Taken together, a total of 80-100 million people live outside of their
countries of origin (citizenship), or perhaps I r/, percent of the entire popula-
tion of the world.3 It follows that increased attention has been devoted to the
effects of refugees, internally displaced, and other migrants have on host
countries' economies and security.a Governments have felt increasing pressure
to curb immigration of all kinds from a public backlash against refugee and
others.
At the same time, humanitarian crises, communal conflicts and a renewed
focus on collective security have drawn more international attention after
the Cold War. Since 1989, the international community has intervened in
ostensibly internal conflicts on a number of occasions in which the Cold War's
ideological stalemate had precluded action in past decades. That a conflict
poses a threat to 'international peace and security' has justified UN involve-
ment; this is the language found in the UN Charter with respect to Chapter
VII enforcement action. These have been 'internal' conflicts insofar as fighting
or other forms of conflict have been contained within particular state borders.
Yet, they have had implications and effects beyond their borders. One of the
most noticeable and urgent results has been the creation of large refugee
flows that have created significant strains on receiving countries or have had
otherwise unwanted and destabilizing consequences.
Refugees have been ubiquitous in all recent instances of significant inter-
national intervention. To what extent did refugee flows or potential refugee
flows play a role in arguments for, and decisions to, intervene? Further, what
are the implications for these recent refugee-related interventions? Do recent
interventions indicate a change in international discourse regarding interven-
tion, thereby changing the basis for legitimate international intervention? In
addition, will intervention lead to an emerging regime of in-country protec-
tion coupled with decreasing support for traditional forms of refugee
protection?
I address such issues by examining several instances of UN sanctioned
military intervention in internal conflicts that produced large refugee popu-
lations 
- 
the creation of safe havens in Northem Iraq to protect Kurds, plus
the diverse cases of Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Rwanda. Despite obvious
differences, all have three things in common. First, they are all situations where
large numbers of refugees have crossed or attempted to cross international
borders. Second, they are all instances where the international community,
through the UN, has undertaken or called for military activity in the refugee-
producing state. Third, they have all taken place since the end of the Cold
War 
- 
that is, since 1989/90.
These cases are examined below through several different lenses. First,
the way in which the intervention is framed in Security Council resolutions
provides clues about how humanitarian actions are conceptualized. Second,
debate before and after interventions gives a glimpse of how the interna-
tional community sees these actions. Third, various political, security, and
humanitarian interests that favor intervention may suggest the likelihood of
further interventions.
Finally, implications for future debates about intervention are considered.
I argue that a convergence of factors 
- 
more refugees, increased public pressure
to assert control over borders, and greater possibilities for Security Council
action 
- 
has led, in some instances, to possibly precedent-setting interven-
tion in cases of mass refusee movements.
Intervention
Intervention in the emerging global order is multi-faceted. At its core are
transborder forceful efforts to influence a govemment or the outcome of an
internationally-relevant situation, regardless of whether a government is
involved. It can include activities such as overthrowing a government or
forcibly annexing territory. However, intervention can also include the
ambiguous use of force that involves governmental acquiescence or resistance,
and the acquiescence or resistance of a rebel group. A state or international
organization undertakes intervention to address a security or humanitarian
problem in a particular territory. Humanitarian intewention focuses atten-
tion on the humanitarian rationales to intervene, and emphasizes action that
mitigates the humanitarian situation.
Outside the strict realm of intervention is the concept of humanitarian access,
including instances where the I-IN or aid organizations negotiate with gov-
ernments to gain access to affected populations in the midst of civil wars or
other humanitarian emergencies, or where humanitarian access is obtained
without the consent of a government, with no military component in either
case. The distinction between access and intervention is important. First,
only states or organizations ofstates have resources to undertake interventions,
while a wide variety of actors can engage in humanitarian access activities.
Second, the legal basis for humanitarian access differs from that for inter-
vention. Third, differences between the two activities have implications for
their conceptualization within discourses about sovereigtrty.t
To what extent might peacekeeping activities fall under the rubric of inter-
vention? Traditional peacekeeping operations would not qualify as intervention
since all parties to a conflict are presumed to have accepted the peacekeepers'
presence. Further, the military component of traditional peacekeeping has been
relatively small. However, there have been instances where peacekeepers
have found themselves in ambiguous situations 
- 
where not all parties accepted
their presence, where they have been attacked by one or more parties to a
conflict, or where the mandate for peacekeeping gradually has been changed
to include more enforcement (that is military) activities. In cases such as
Somalia and Bosnia, the line between peacekeeping and intervention becomes
blurred, and the international community is drawn to intervene whether it
had intended to do so or not.
This article concerns instances where multilateral military operation have
been undertaken or threatened in refugee-producing or potentially refugee-
producing situations. Once identified, were these interventions undertaken
for security or humanitarian reasons? Further, can one distinguish between
the two? Answers to these questions will be significant for how interven-
tions are conceptualized and carried out in the future.
Cases
The Kurds
Forceful action undertaken or legitimated by the international community
was first undertaken after the end of the Cold War in Operation Desert Storm
(early 1991) the essentially US operation which expelled Iraqi forces from
Kuwait. At the end of the war, as a result of increased persecution of the Kurds
living in northern Iraq by the Iraqi regime, approximately 1.8 million Kurds
tried to flee. 1.4 million went to Iran (where, by May 1991, there was a total
of 2.3 million Iraqi refugees), and another 400,000 went to the border with
Turkey where they were prevented from entering the country.6 In response,
several UN and unilateral actions were taken.
First, on April 5th, the Security Council passed Resolution 688, which
'insist[ed] that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian
organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq. . . .' The
legitimacy of this resolution was vigorously debated. France argued that
massive human rights abuses, even if not accompanied by threats to interna-
tional security, were worthy of intervention by the Security Council, which
'would have been remiss in its task had it stood idly by, without reacting
to the massacre of entire populations, the extermination of civilians, includ-
ing women and children.'7 China, which abstained on the vote for 688,
made reference to the 'domestic jurisdiction' clause in Article 2(7) of the
UN Charter, arguing that it was an internal matter.8 The resolution made
it clear that it was not violations of human rights but the consequences
of those violations 
- 
refugees as threats to peace and security 
- 
which pro-
vided the basis for Security Council action.e As US Ambassador Thomas
Pickering stated: 'The transboundary impact of Iraq's treatment of its civilian
population threatens regional stability.'10 However, some members did cite
human rights concerns as legitimating international interest. France argued
that such violations come under international concern 'when they take
on such proportions that they assume the dimension of a crime against
humanity.'rrBritain concurred. Others argued that the UN had a responsi-
bility to follow through on events arising out of earlier actions in Kuwait
and Iraq.r2
Several forces pushed the allies toward intervention. First, Stromseth notes
that: 'As television reports brought their suffering into homes around the world,
Western governments could no longer characterize the situation in Iraq as a
strictly "internal" matter.'r3 This relates to what has been called the'CNN
effect'; to many, the United States and other govemments appear to respond
to humanitarian emergencies only when global media focus on a particular
situation, showing graphic pictures on evening news broadcasts which
generates domestic pressure to 'do something.' This is not always true, and
rarely can one find a simplistic correlation between television coverage and
action.ra However, a number of recent incidents, from world reaction to the
1984-85 famine in Ethiopia to the US intervention in Somalia would seem
to bear this out.
James Mayall has a slightly different interpretation in the Iraqi case, arguing
that policy changed 'because the attention devoted by the Western media to
the plight of the Kurds along the Turkish border threatened the political div-
idends that Western governments had secured from the conduct of the war
itself.'rs That is, rather than responding to popular calls for intervention, the
US and other countries were more worried about undermining the fruits of
their victory against Hussein. In addition, the United States had an interest
in further weakening Saddam Hussein's grip on power, and saw such activity
as a means to this end. Yet, American reluctance to intervene at the outset,
suggests that this was not the only motivation behind its eventual action.r6
France and Turkey ensured that the Security Council considered the Kurdish
situation. France's interest in the human rights aspects of this situation have
been noted. Turkey's interest was clear; it had its own Kurdish population,
with which it was essentially aI wat. Certainly it did not want hundreds of
thousands, and perhaps up to one million, more Kurds flowing into Turkey.
While Ankara recognized that allowing their kin into Turkey might have engen-
dered good will among Kurds in Turkey, there was also concern that this would
altract even more refugees.rT In addition, the prospect of having even more
people to join the Kurdish uprising was frightening to the government.
Nor did Ankara want to be responsible for hundreds of thousands of refugees
without any international assistance. Turkey argued that these refugee flows
were a threat to regional security. Iran argued the same with respect to the
Kurds in the northern part of the country and Shi'ite Muslims in the south.r8
Turkey pushed its NATO allies to help it cope with this situation by pro-
tecting these refugees and internally displaced who might become refugees.
As one diplomat stated, the US was primarily concerned that 'refugee con-
centrations in Turkey were threatening to become semi-permanent locations
for the Kurds that could spell trouble and economic headache for Ankara for
years to come'.le
The nature and geography of the international response to Kurdish refugees
is telling. Safe havens were set up near the Turkish border, and significant
amounts of aid were sent to this region. Further, there were 'psychological
operations teams persuading refugees to come down from the border moun-
tains,' with a planned rate of 7,000 per day over thirty days.2o Such persuasion
helped Turkey reduce the pressure and perceived threat from refugees. The
same was not true of refugees in Iran. Safe havens were not close to the Iranian
border, and relatively little aid was provided to those in Iran. Many refugees
who returned from Iran did so because of the paucity of humanitarian assis-
tance. We can account for such a disparity by close relations Turkey enjoyed
with the allies, and the antagonistic relations Iran had with the West:2r 'In
effect, the refugees for whom Iran was the nearest border were penalized for
their host government's poor relations with the United States.'22
The United Kingdom, France, and the (initially reluctant) United States
declared, first, a 'no-fly zone' in northern Iraq (as well as in southern Iraq
where the Shi'ite population was threatened), and second, a plan to create
Kurdish enclaves, protected from the Iraqi military and introduced forces to
carry out this plan. The result has been a de facto Kurdish state in Northern
Iraq. These countries relied on resolution 688 to legitimize their actions. Yet,
resolution 688 did not specifrcally authorize force, and the Secretary-General
did not request it, although he did acquiesce in the intervention.23 Thus, while
the Allied powers were engaging in activity which responded to the spirit of
resolution 688, the consortium of great powers did not adhere to the letter
of the resolution.
The UN had a separate presence in northern Iraq. Iraq signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the UN on April 18, 1991 which
allowed the UN to have a presence in all of Iraq 
- 
not just the north 
-to provide
humanitarian aid to the 'affected Iraqi civilian population.' This was sup-
posedly based on a request from Iraq. That Iraq was already under military
pressure from the Allies, and was also a defeated country, however, meant
that this action was not voluntary.'o The United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (LINHCR) played a significant role in providing humanitarian
assistance. However, its role also has been criticized. Specifically, UNHCR
acquiesced in Turkey's decision to deny Kurdish refugees the right to cross
its borders (which was temporarily reversed).2s Instead, UNHCR assisted the
Kurds within Iraq, thereby aiding Turkey in keeping Kurds out.
Situations such as this prompted a UNHCR official to state that the orga-
nization was becoming a'Migration Management Organization,' helping states
maintain sovereign control of their borders.26 It is unclear what else UNHCR,
by itself, could have done 
- 
it has no troops or other resources to force a
government to open its border. However, as argued below, this is but one of
the first instances in which the focus has been to prevent people from leaving
their countries of origin, thus not becoming refugees in other countries. Such
situations offer no effective asylum options.
Allied troops on the ground were later replaced by a IIN contingent known
as the UN guards, which were deployed within the framework of the MOU.
They were to protect Kurds in safe havens (although the MOU made no explicit
mention of protecting the Kurds), both those which stayed in Iraq, as well
as those who were persuaded to return from the border region by the implicit
promise of allied, and then UN, protection." In fact, the main deterrent to Iraqi
incursions remained the air power which enforced the no-fly zone.
The allied intervention was unquestionably a violation of Iraqi sovereignty.
This led to a curious situation where those who, just months earier, took
forceful action to uphold the sanctity of state sovereignty were, undermining
that same concept.28 Further, these actions demonstrate an increased willing-
ness among some more powerful state actors to take forceful humanitarian
action in contravention of a state's wishes.2e
At the same time, however, the Kurdish intervention showed Security
Council reluctance explicitly to authorize force.30 Resolution 688 focused on
the intemational effects of human rights abuses 
- 
i.e. refugees 
- 
while some
of its supporters also argued that human rights abuses themselves were grounds
for intervention. Refugee flows seem to have been the most significant factor
precipitating intervention, within which security aspects of the refugees were
the principal concern, while humanitarian aspects occupied an important but
still secondary position.
Somalia
IIN involvement in Somalia was notably different from actions in northern
Iraq. In Somalia, Siad Barre's regime fell in January 1991, quickly leading
to an escalation of civil strife and the collapse of state authority. Various
humanitarian organizations were in the country aiding the displaced and other
victims of continuing violence. As the civil war intensified, it became harder
to ensure that aid could get where it was needed, and some organizations
were forced to hire some groups who were continuing the fighting as private
security to protect aid convoys, with varying degrees of success. In 1991
and early 1992, aid organizations began to call attention to an impending
famine. In fact, the World Food Program had predicted famine in December
1990.31 By August L992 it was estimated that as many as 1.5 million people
were in immediate danger of starvation, and perhaps 4.5 million people were
at risk of being affected by malnutrition.3z In December, it was estimated
that 400,000 people had died from starvation.33
The refugee situation continued to worsen from 1991 into 1992. The number
of Somali refugees who fled to neighboring Ethiopia and Djibouti had peaked
by the end of 1991, but the numbers of refugees in Kenya continued to grow
in1992. During the middle part of 1992, as many as 1,000 Somalis a day
were streaming into Kenya.3a By the end of 1992, there were also approxi-
mately 2 million internally displaced persons in Somalia, many of whom
were potential refugees.35
The international community was slow to take concrete action to address
the security issue. Many of the aid agencies that had been in the country for
a number of years continued their work under increasingly trying circum-
stances, although some pulled out because of the insecure conditions under
which they were forced to operate. In fact, because of that insecurity, the United
States, which had begun to mount an aid airlift, but did not want to actually
land in the country, proposed dropping parcels of food from the air. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said this would disrupt its
humanitarian networks among the various factions.36
The global community appeared indifferent. The end of the Cold War
seemed to presage a new era of cooperation in the UN and greater possibil-
ities for a wide variety of humanitarian actions, and activities in Iraq appeared
to show this. However, unlike Iraq, there was no oil or other strategic con-
siderations to justiff Somalia as a vital US interest. Indeed, as the struggle
for the hearts and minds of the Third World dissipated with the Cold War,
so did Western interest in Africa.37 Economic and other resources were put into
reconstructing the economies of Eastern Europe, leaving less money and less
attention to Africa (with the exception, of course, of South Africa which had
a unique mixture of strategic and political interests to ensure that it received
attention).
The UN Security Council first took note of the situation in Somalia with
resolution 733 of January 23, 1992. It stated that the Security Council was
'[g]ravely alarmed at the rapid deterioration of the situation in Somalia and
the heavy loss of life . . . and aware of its consequences on stability and
peace in the region,' and that it was 'fc]oncerned that the continuation of
this situation constitutes . . . a threat to intemational peace and security.' It
called on the UN and other organizations to increase humanitarian assistance
and for the parties in the region to ensure their safety. It also imposed a military
embargo on Somalia under Chapter VII of the Charter. On March 3, 1992,
two of the major leaders in the civil war signed a cease-fire. However, fighting
continued and, on March 17,the Security Council passed resolution 746,which
used similar language to frame the issue: it was 'fd]eeply disturbed by the
magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict and concemed that
the continuation of the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to interna-
tional peace and security,' and it called on all parties to ensure the security
of humanitarian workers.
Resolution 751, which was adopted on April 24, :used exactly the same
language as the previous resolutions with regard to the connection between
human suffering and peace and security in the region. It established a peace-
keeping force for Somalia 
- 
United Nations Operations in Somalia (LINOSOM)
- 
which was to monitor the cease-fire and provide security for humanitarian
convoys in Mogadishu and the surrounding area. Final agreement on the
deployment of LINOSOM was not achieved with all parties to the conflict until
June 23.38 Resolution 767 of Jttly 27,1992, continued to make the connec-
tion between the humanitarian situation and a threat to international peace
and security, and called on all parties to cooperate with the UN and aid
organizations. However, the Security Council did say, for the first time, that
it 'does not exclude other measures to deliver humanitarian assistance to
Somalia.' This is a clear reference to the possible use of force to protect
humanitarian aid. On August 28 the Council passed resolution 775 which
expanded UNOSOM to 3,500 troops, although they were never deployed.
However, it is doubtful that even this number of peacekeeping forces would
have had much of an effect outside of Mogadishu. What was needed was a
peace enforcement operation rather than a peace keeping force.3e
Such an operation finally occurred in December 1992 after the Security
Council passed resolution 794 on December 3rd. The United States had offered
to mount an extensive intervention in the country under UN auspices. The
resolution authorized 'all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a
secure environment for humanitarian operations in Somalia.' This force became
the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), code named Operation Restore Hope, and
involved the deployment of troops on December 9th. At its height, UNITAF
involved 37,000 troops.ao
In the short term, intervention had a positive effect overall. The southern
part of the country which UNITAF controlled was significantly more secure,
more relief shipments were being delivered, and the threat of starvation
receded. Yet, there were still significant problems related to the disarming,
or lack thereof, various factions. When UNITAF withdrew in May 1993 to
be replaced by LINOSOM II, these problems remained.ar
What are the implications of IIN and US action? First, in none of the
Security Council resolutions leading to UNOSOM and IINITAF were refugees
mentioned. Each and every resolution referred to humanitarian suffering and
the conflict in general as a threat to international peace and security. Framing
the matter in such a way continued the practice of resolution 688 which
portrayed effects of the persecution of the Kurds in the same way. However,
688 also laid out the connection between human rights abuses and refugee
flows. This obviously worried states bordering Somalia. While Turkey had
its NATO allies to ensure that its concerns with respect to Kurdish refugees
received Security Council attention, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti had no such
relationship with great powers, and thus were unable to insert their fears into
the Security Council agenda. Further, making this specifrc link might have
increased pressure on the Security Council to address the refugee crisis directly
and earlier with Chapter VII action.
The UN was dealing with the refugee crisis in a significant manner. LINHCR
set up innovative crossborder 'Preventive Zones' along the Kenya/Somalia and
Kenya/Ethiopia borders. These programs were set up to help all displaced
persons in this region, regardless of the country where they were present.
Aiding internally displaced in Somalia, it was thought, might prevent them
from becoming refugees; and, viewing the entire region as a contiguous zone
of operation would allow UNHCR to more easily facilitate repatriation of
Somali refugees.a2 Kenya certainly saw the refugees as security threats and
wanted them to go home.a3 The presence of Somali refugees resulted in a
'brazen wave of killings, rapes, and armed robberies throughout 1992,' which
occurred as a result of weapons smuggled into Kenya from Somalia and used
by Kenyan and Somali gangs, and '[p]ersistent robberies and vehicle thefts
on highways forced relief workers to travel with police protection between
refugee camps.' Both Somalis and Kenyan police were blamed for the
violence.aa That the presence of refugees, and other factors, contributed to
the insecurity of Kenyan refugee zones on the Somali border is, however,
undeniable.
The forceful intervention, which provided a significant albeit temporary
improvement in Somalia's internal security and humanitarian conditions, came
almost two years after Somalia had begun its final descent into complete chaos
after the ouster of Siad Barre. Why did it take so long and why did the US
finally intervene? The LIN had put considerably more emphasis and spent more
money on the peacekeeping operation in Cambodia, although 'it might be
argued that the security situation in Cambodia was not as desperate as it was
in Somalia.' For most of 1992 the commitment to Bosnia-Herzegovina was
also greater.o' This, as noted above, reflected a shift away from Africa as an
area of interest. Further, Bosnia was of a more direct interest to some of the
permanent members of the Security Council. Kenya and Ethiopia, on the
other hand, had no such leverage. Although they were being affected directly
and negatively by Somali fighting, any concerns they might have had did
not carry the same weight.
Samuel Makinda argues that, by the end of 1992, Boutros-Ghali and US
President George Bush had convergent interests in undertaking more forceful
action. Boutros Ghali was frustrated that warlords and clan leaders had
prevented the deployment of UNOSOM I. George Bush, on the other hand,
'was embarrassed by the fact that the new world order, which was identified
with US leadership, was now characterized by the mass starvation of Somali
children.'46 Bush waited until after the Presidential election in early November
to go ahead with his offer of forces. He had not wanted such action to harm
his ultimately unsuccessful bid for re-election. At the same time, television
news was filled with pictures of the 'mass starvation of Somali children,'
and there was, consequently, increased public pressure for him to take action
to ameliorate the situation.aT That is, he was being subjected to the afore-
mentioned 'CNN effect.' As one observer argues, 'it is diffrcult to imagine that
the West will stop choosing its "victims" on the basis of whim and interest.'48
The whim in the case of Somalia was that starving children in that country
were put on television, while the tens of thousands killed in southern Sudan
were not. The interest appears to have been President Bush's need to react
to public pressure, created by those images, to do something.
The US put the intervention solely in terms of humanitarianism, ignoring
the political dimensions of the problem: 'The US interpretation, which left
aside the crucial problem of a political settlement, fitted in well with its
ambitious timetable to start withdrawing American troops as early as January
and its commitment to "zeto casualties," an approach influenced by the lack
of conviction behind a media-driven intervention.'ae
Thus, refugee flows played a much different role in Somalia than in the case
of the Kurds in lraq. In Somalia, the US and other Western countries had no
strategic interests and, as a result, saw no vital interests requiring quick inter-
vention. The intervention which did occur was, in a significant way, based
on humanitarian grounds. While Bush may have been pushed into it by an
outpouring of public compassion (or, rather, pity),to the basis for interven-
tion was humanitarian. One million refugees were added to the mix of
humanitarian concerns. The horrific situation in Somalia proper, rather than
direct international effects (i.e. refugees), was the focus. The Security Council,
while not identifuing refugees as the basis for its actions, nevertheless implied
that its resolutions were due to such a concern. In sum, the problem of refugees
is thoroughly interwoven with other factors that led to peacekeeping and
intervention in Somalia in 1992.
Haiti
The case of Haiti brought together dramatic flows of refugees, human rights
concems, Chapter VII action by the Security Council, and direct interest of
one of the great powers. As such, Haiti exemplifies an environment in which
UN action is predictable. Reactions in the region to external intervention
may also have established a precedent.
On September 30, 1991, Jean Bertrand Aristide, Haiti's first democrati-
cally elected president, was overthrown in a military coup. Duting the next
three years, we saw the spectacle of small fragile boats filled with refugees
trying to make it to the United States. Uneven and ineffective reaction by
the OAS and UN, including the imposition of sanctions ostensibly against
the military government that followed Aristide, were the hallmarks of
r99t-1993.
The OAS was the first international body to take action in the wake of
the coup. The OAS called on Aristide to be returned to power, declared that
the military govemment would not be recognized, and recommended sanctions.
Less than two weeks after the coup, the UN General Assembly passed
resolution 467 condemning the military takeover. Throughout 1992, the OAS
continued to be the focus of international activity aimed at returning Aristide
to power.sl
On December Il, 1992, however, the UN Secretary-General appointed a
special representative on Haitian matters. From that point on, the UN became
the focal point for international response to Haiti's crisis. As Acevedo argues,
the 'shift to the UN forum was prompted, at least in part, by the prospect of
a massive influx of refugees, which drew high-level attention to Haiti's crisis
in early January 1993, both from the outgoing Bush administration and from
President-elect Bill Clinton'.52
In fact, the flow of refugees from Haiti had become a significant policy
issue earlier in 1992. Haitians had been attempting to reach the US by boat
for many years, and the US Coast Guard routinely interdicted them. Between
1981 and 1990,24,000 Haitians were stopped at sea, while only six were
allowed to make asylum claims in the US. Following the coup, the Coast Guard
began taking Haitians to the US naval base at Guant6namo Bay, Cuba, where
they were 'screened in' to make claims for asylum. Soon, there were as many
as 12,000 Haitians at the base. In May 1992, President Bush ordered the
Coast Guard to return these people to Haiti without evaluating their asylum
claims. Through 1992, more that 40,000 Haitian had been interdicted, and
during that year 29,500 had been forcibly returned.s3 Only 54 Haitians were
admitted to the US as refugees.5a Thus, by the time the UN became involved
in a significant way in December 1992, Haiti was a major policy priority for
one of the biggest players in the UN.
During the 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton stated that he would
reverse the policy of forced repatriation. However, just before he was
inaugurated, he announced that he would continue that policy, and that only
asylum claims made in Haiti would be evaluated.55 The policy seemed to
have its intended effect 
- 
discouraging Haitians from leaving Haiti and
attempting to reach the US 
- 
and only 2,329 Haitian were interdicted and
retumed in 1993.56
But conditions which prompted the refugee exodus in the first place were
still in place. On April 4, 1994 exiled President Aristide gave a six-month
notice ending the 1981 accord between Haiti and the US which had allowed
the repatriations. One month later, President Clinton announced that asylum
claims would be processed on ships. A hunger strike by Randall Robinson,
Director of TransAfrica (a non-governmental organizalion), may have been
partially responsible for Clinton's change of policy.57 At the same time, the
Haitian military began to make it harder for Haitians to leave the country.
However, many were able to leave, and 24,917 Haitians were stopped and taken
into Coast Gaurd custody in 1994. At the same time, the US began using
Gu6ntanamo Bay to process the refugees.tt It also tried to get countries in
the region to allow processing and to take in some of the refugees, at least
temporarily.se In July, the US changed policy again and announced that
Gu6ntanamo Bay would be used as a temporary safe haven for refugees, but
that no refugees would be eligible for resettlement in the US.60
The Security Council passed its first resolution on Haiti on June 16,1993,
a year and a half after the coup. Resolution 841 'noted with concern the
incidence of humanitarian crises, including mass displacement of population,
becoming or aggravating threats to intemational peace and security,' and stated
that it was:
. . . concerned that the persistence of this situation contributed to a climate
of fear and persecution and economic dislocation which could increase
the number of Haitians seeking refuge in neighbouring Member States
and convinced that a reversal of this situation is needed to prevent its
negative repercussions on the region . . .
It found that the Haitian crisis 'defines a unique and exceptional situation
warranting extraordinary measures by the Security Council. . . . [and] the
continuation ofthis situation threatens international peace and security.' And,
it implemented sanctions against Haiti under Chapter VII. On August 27,
resolution 861 suspended the sanctions when it seemed that the coup leaders
were implementing the Governor's Island agreement which was to restore
Aristide to power. After the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was
prevented from arriving in Haiti by the military and it was clear that the de
facto atthorities were not implementing the agreement in good faith, resolu-
tion 872 of October 13, 1993 reinstated sanctions. On May 6, l994,just two
days before President Clinton announced the policy of shipboard processing
of refugee claims, the Security Council tightened sanctions with resolution9lT.
Resolution 933 of June 30 noted 'the deterioratins humanitarian situation in
Haiti' and 'that the situation in Haiti continues to constitute a threat to peace
and security in the region. . . .'
It was not until resolution 940 of July 31 which authorized military action
to reinstall Aristide that refugees were mentioned specifically again. Resolution
940 stated that the Security Council was:
Gravely concerned by the significant further deterioration of the humani-
tarian situation in Haiti, in particular the continuing escalation by the illegal
de facto regime of systematic violations of civil liberties, the desperate plight
of Haitian refugees . . .
It determined 'that the situation in Haiti continues to constitute a threat to
international peace and security in the region. . .' The US heightened its
rhetoric regarding its will to intervene over the ensuing month and a half
and US military ships were moved into position off of Haiti. Finally, a settle-
ment was reached with a team led by former President Jimmy Carter on
September 18 after the military leadership found out that a US invasion force
was on its way and paratroopers would land in a few hours.6t Aristide returned
to Haiti on October 15- 1994.62
Haiti is the clearest case to date of refugee flows leading to eventual
intervention. Michael J. Glennon argues that, in resolution 940, the'Security
Council dealt with the refugee problem not as a potential cross-border threat
but, rather, in the context of humanitarian considerations.'63 The Council did
speak about 'the desperate plight of Haitian refugees,' in contrast to resolu-
tion 688 about Iraq that mentioned the 'massive flow of refugees towards
and across international frontiers and . . . cross-border incursions, which
threaten international peace and security in the region. . . .'Even in their
role as helpless victims rather than as a national security threat, refugees can
be seen as a basis for intervention. Yet, resolution 940 on Haiti must be
placed within the context of the previous three years. Given such a perspec-
tive, refugees as direct threats to international peace and security were the
motive for eventual US-led intervention. Certainly resolution 841 made the
direct connection between refugees and security.
In addition, because the US undertook the intervention, Washington's
motives are particularly relevant rather than those of each Security Council
member. Between Ihe coup and August 1994,67,493 Haitians were interdicted
at sea; most of these were forcibly repatriated. In August there were also
approximately 14,000 Haitians at Guantanamo Bay.s The US obviously had
little concern for them as refugees. Rather, they were seen as a security threat
- 
a mass of humanity to be kept out of the country. This feeling must have
been reinforced by a vigorous debate in the US about immigration and growing
anti-immigration sentiment, particularly in Florida where Haitians would
have landed had they made it to the mainland.6s
The Haitian crisis must also be nut in the context of the develooins Cuban
refugee crisis. In 1994,the numbers of asylum seekers from Cuba attempting
to reach the US expanded dramatically, from 3,656 in 1993 to 37,139 in
1994. As a result of increased tensions between Cuba and the US. Fidel
Castro made it easier for people to leave. President Clinton then announced
that Cubans, too, would be taken to Guantdnamo Bay and held, reversing a
longstanding policy of giving presumptive refugee status to Cubans.66 Thus
faced with the prospect of tens thousands of boat people arriving on its shores
from two different countries simultaneously, the US tightened up it borders
even more.
Further, it is noteworthy that intervention came only weeks before the
agreement allowing for the repatriation of Haitians was to have expired. Had
that expiration occurred, US efforts to interdict and repatriate Haitians would
have been challenged and would have appeared illegitimate. Certainly the
Clinton Administration considered these damaging prospects when deciding
if and when to intervene. That the US returned Haitian refugees to a dangerous
situation in violation of its international commitments, and that it took so
long to intervene6T led to the conclusion that only increased international
criticism and a mounting refugee crisis brought military action on September
18,1994. Beyond the US, however, some Latin American countries unaffected
by the refugee crisis supported forceful action to return Aristide to power.
Although not a consensus view, Haitian crisis may prove to be a precedent.68
However, despite previous Latin American opposition to intervention, there
may now be increasing support for humanitarian intervention, of which refugee
flows will probably be a part:
But a precedent is being created that could well rescue some future
democratic government in Nicaragua or Trinidad or even Paraguay from the
hands of its own soldiers 
- 
and, more importantly, will deter the soldiers
from seizing power in many more countries. It is not just an American
initiative, and it is not just business as usual.6e
A contrary view is offered by Michael Glennon who argues that the prece-
dent will be ambiguous at best:
In Haiti . . . sovereignty lost. But sovereignty's loss was not an unarguable
gain for the community of nations, because the community has not ade-
quately considered either the rationale for continued as hoc opportunism
or the impact of its precedents on future attempts to avoid the piecemeal
and move toward principle.To
Haiti represents a case where security aspects of refugee flows were the
main impetus behind intervention. A significant, but still ambiguous, role in
creating a legitimate basis for intervention may also have been played by
humanitarian considerations.
The former Yugoslavia
The international response to war and genocide in the former Yugoslavia
indicates what can happen when there is no will to address an internation-
ally relevant conflict, combined with potentially large numbers of refugees.
Confronted with large numbers of potential refugees, European countries
emphasized not the right to seek asylum, but rather the right to remain in
ineffectual 'safe zones' for which the UN supposedly guaranteed security.
As Yugoslavia disintegrated in 1991, fighting erupted in two former
republics. Although federal (Serb) forces withdrew from Slovenia after brief
skirmishes, and UN peacekeepers (tlN Protection Force 
- 
UNPROFORTI) were
deployed in Croatia in January 1992. In April, the European Union recog-
nized Bosnian independence and fighting broke out in that republic as well.72
Over the ensuing months, the fighting escalated and the 'ethnic cleansing' 
-
genocide 
- 
of Bosnian Muslims became evident. Refugees flowed among
and out of the republics. By the end of 1994, there were 2.6 million refugees
and internally displaced in and around the former republics. Approximately
530,000 refugees were in Europe, of whom more than 300,000 were in
Germany alone. The rest of the displaced were in the former territory of
Yugoslavia, either as refugees or as internally displaced.T3
The overall international response to the genocide in the former Yugoslavia
was very weak. After the fighting spread to Bosnia, UNPROFOR peacekeepers
were deployed to protect aid convoys. Yet, they had a very circumscribed
mandate to use force. Commanders on the ground had to rely almost entirely
on negotiations to get aid through to where it is needed, frequently resulting
in delays of weeks or months. The UN and NATO periodically made bold
statements regarding the need to use force to ensure humanitarian aid can
get to where it is needed and to end the Serbian siege of several Muslim
enclaves which were designated 'safe zones' by the UN, most notably Sarajevo.
However, in the face of demonstrated genocide, hundreds of thousands dead,
and two million refugees, the international community generally failed to
take forceful action to address the situation.to The only exceptions to this
were a few instances where NATO forces bombed Serbian forces which
violated the so called 'safe zones' around the enclaves. which turned out not
to be very safe at all. Yet, until the spring and summer of 1995 
- 
more than
three years after the genocide became apparent to the world community 
- 
these
were very limited and did not result in significant improvements.Ts Only then
did NATO expand its air strikes, to such a degree that along with Croatian
and Bosnian gains on the ground, the Serbs finally negotiated an end to the
war.76 In addition, the UN had imposed sanctions on Serbia for its support
of the Bosnian Serbs, which caused substantial economic strains in Belgrade.
Had force been used three years earlier, the course of the entire conflict may
have been dramatically changed.
The first of many Security Council resolutions on the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia was 713. It referred to the 'heavy loss of life and material damage,
and . . . the consequences for the countries in the region' which constituted
a 'threat to international peace and security,' and it imposed an affns embargo
on Yugoslavia. Resolution 724 was the first to refer to displaced persons, as
a group in need of assistance, rather than as refugees or potential refugees.
Resolution 7 52 noled'the large number of refugees and displaced persons' and
supported the efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance and facilitate volun-
tary return of the displaced. ResolutionTT0 noted 'that the situation in Bosnia
and Herzegovina constitutes a threat to international peace and security and
that the provision of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina is
an important element in the Council's effort to restore international peace
and security in the area.' It also mentioned the possibility of creating 'safe
areas,' and Resolution 824 formally declared Sarajevo and other cities to be
such.
From 1991 through 1995, there were 9l Security Council resolutions on
the former Yugoslavia 
- 
25% of the 361 total resolutions during that five
year period 
- 
but only one referred to refugees specifically, while a couple
others referred broadly to displaced persons. In general, the resolutions, when
referring to threats to international peace and security 
- 
on which interna-
tional action could be based 
- 
put such threats in the generic terms of 'the
situation,' fighting, and various facets of the humanitarian situation. As
opposed to the case of the Kurds and resolution 688, mass flows of refugees
were not explicitly constructed as 'threats to international peace and security.'
Nonetheless, refugees were definitely a concern to the West, and in par-
ticular countries such as Germany.
Those supporting UN involvement in the conflict used three intertwined
justifications for that involvement. These were that the refugee situation, the
humanitarian situation resulting from the war, and the human rights viola-
tions perpetrated by the Bosnian Serbs threatened international peace and
security.TT Certainly the general humanitarian situation (which included massive
displacement) and the genocide of the Muslims received significant atten-
tion and figured prominently in Security Council resolutions legitimating the
(ultimately rather mild) forceful actions. Those refugees which fled the
territory of the former Yugoslavia received much less attention, although
they played a significant role in the wider milieu of European immigration
policy.
As a result of significant increases in refugee claims from a number of
different countries in the 1980s,78 and alongside deepening European inte-
gration, several agreements were signed to attempt to better control refugees
movement in Europe. These include the Schengen Agreements of 1985 and
1990 and the Dublin Convention of 1990 which were intended to harmonize
policies related to asylum and the general movement of people into and among
a number of West European countries.Te When the war first started, some states
passed special laws to allow in refugees from Croatia, although as the war
spread, states began to restrict the numbers of refugees. States then waffled
between opening and closing borders to refugees, at least partly in response
to public mood.
Significant public unrest, however, was associated with dramatically
increasing numbers of refugees. Nowhere was this more evident than in
Germany, which had the single largest refugee population, particularly a pro-
portion of prior residents. In 1993, Germany signifrcantly amended the 1949
Basic Law which had allowed almost anybody to enter and apply for asylum
and receive welfare benehts.80 The followingyear, the German Border Guard
was given new powers to operate outside their traditional areas of operation
to crack down on smugglers and illegal immigrants.sr
The increased desire to control borders, coupled with increasing numbers
of refugees, were an impetus behind the creation of 'safe areas.' The logic
is simple: 'By having certain regions that are safe so that people would not
have to leave in the first place, the pressure on asylum countries would thus
be relieved.'82 Safe areas were also expected to have a humanitarian effect 
-
ameliorating the conditions which forced some to become refugees 
- 
as well
as decreasing the number of asylum seekers in Europe.
This focus on prevention went hand in hand with a more general interest
in preventive protection by LINHCR and others. UNHCR has acqoired a de
facto expanded mandate which includes providing assistance to a wide variety
of groups of people including the internally displaced and others within a
conflict zone. Aiding such individuals might mitigate some of the factors which
lead them to become 'official' refugees 
- 
those that have crossed an interna-
tional border 
- 
rather than internally displaced. However, there is great concern
that increased interest in the 'right to remain' may, at the same time, under-
mine the right to leave and seek asylum. Not only is this an unintended
consequence, but may also be behind the focus on in-country protection. As
noted, this was a major reason behind the creation of 'safe havens' in northern
Iraq. The former Yugoslavia is thus another instance, like Iraqi Kurdistan
and Haiti, where the institution of asylum is being eroded.83
In the former Yugoslavia, UNHCR was designated the 'lead agency,' and
thus moved from its original mandate of helping refugees, to addressing the
source of refugees.8a It could not adequately perform this function for two
reasons. First, stopping refugee flows required a political solution to end the
fighting and genocide. Second, TINHCR did not have the necessary backup
to ensure that it could gain access to affected populations. That is, the so-called
'safe areas' were not safe at all.85 Although the Security Council made pro-
nouncement after pronouncement regarding the safe areas, and repeatedly
declared its intention to defend them with force and retaliate if attacked, it
did not follow through with its threats and residents ofthese areas continued
to be in constant danger. At one point in August 1992, the US sought to
move from 'preventive protection . . . [toward] an even more minimalist
concept of preventive assistance, in which protection was no longer to be a
prerequisite for preventing refugee flows.'86 Rhetoric from world leaders
continued to be about safe areas and protection. Yet, such an early discus-
sion of aid being sufficient to prevent refugee flows presaged the following
three years without political will to provide real protection while also under-
mining asylum possibilities.
At the same time, the focus on internal protection (however flawed in
practice) did have the effect of keeping most displaced persons within the
boundaries of the former republics. First, because of the lack of follow through,
some cities, like Sarajevo, were under siege and the residents could not leave
and become 'displaced' in the first place. Second, aid that did get through
had a partially ameliorative effect, thus allowing the European countries to
claim that they were providing an altemative to refugeehood.87 The reality was
much different. These resolutions and partial aid activities 'servefd] to maintain
a facade of humane concern'88 while actually undermining access to asylum.
Thus, refugee flows were significant in international policy concerning
the former Yugoslavia. But, for four years this policy included almost no
forceful action to protect the displaced. Focusing on a right to remain,
while providing no credible force to ensure that right enabled European coun-
tries to undermine asylum and keep out potential refugees when immigration
had become a significant domestic policy issue among West European
publics.
Rwanda
The genocide in Rwanda and its aftermath resulted in one the largest refugee
populations 
- 
about 2 million 
- 
in recent years. Within a relatively short
time, conditions in and near Rwanda produced more deaths than all situa-
tions discussed above combined. Yet, little was done by the international
community to prevent the slaughter or to respond to the humanitarian crisis.
After the assassination of President Juvenal Habyarimana of Rwanda on
April 6, 1994, the latent civil war reemerged and a genocide of minority
Tutsi and Hutu supporters by the majority Hutu began in Rwanda. In the
following two and a half months, on the order of one million people were
slaughtered, and by the end of the year 1.7 million refugees had flowed out
of the country while another 1.2 million were displaced within the country.8e
Most of these refugees were Hutu who were fleeing potential retribution for
the genocide, including leaders and others who actually perpetrated the
genocide, as well as Hutus who did not participate in the killing.eo Although
nobody could know exactly when the genocide would start, there was advance
knowledge by the commander of the UN Mission for Rwanda (LINAMIR),
Gen. Romeo Dallaire, that a genocide was being planned. His informant, a
'very important' government offlrcial, claimed that Hutu forces could kill 1,000
people per twenty minutes.er This information was passed on to UN head-
quarters in New York but seems to have gotten lost in the bureaucracy.e2 In
the days following the beginning of the massacre, UNAMIR tried to engage
in what protection activities it could. With few troops at its disposal, a weak
mandate and few resources. UNAMIR could do little. In fact. a number of
Belgian soldiers were killed by the Hutu forces, after which the Belgian
govemment withdrew its troops from UNAMIR.e3
The first Security Council resolution, 912, came on April 21, fifteen days
after the genocide started. Rather than increasing UNAMIR troop strength
to a level where it might be able to intervene and prevent further killing, it
withdrew all but 270 troops, leaving it impotent in the face of continuing
carnage. It did note 'the displacement of a significant number of the Rwandese
population, including those who sought refuge with I-INAMIR, and the
significant increase in refugees to neighbouring countries . . .' Widespread
killing and large masses of refugees, however, did not seem to require sub-
stantial forceful action in the eyes of the Security Council. Resolution 918
came almost a month later on May 17. It stated that the Securitv Council
was
Deeply concerned that the situation in Rwanda, which has resulted in the
death of many thousands of innocent civilians, including women and
children, the internal displacement of a significant percentage of the
Rwandan population, and the massive exodus of refugees to neighbouring
countries, constitutes a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions . . .
It was also 'concerned that the continuation of the situation in Rwanda con-
stitutes a threat to peace and security in the region.' The resolution expanded
the mandate of UNAMIR to include protection of the refugees and other
displaced, or at risk civilians in Rwanda, the creation of 'secure humani-
tarian areas,' and the protection of humanitarian relief operations. It also
expanded the size of UNAMIR to 5,500, although these troops were not
deployed until much later.ea Resolution 925 of June 8 again noted that 'the
internal displacement of some 1.5 million Rwandans facing starvation and
disease and the massive exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries con-
stitute a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions . . .'
Resolution 929 of June 22,which noted that'the magnitude of the human-
itarian crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,'
represented a partial turning point in intemational reaction to the genocide.
France had oflered to intervene to protect those at risk and to provide security
for humanitarian convoys, and the Security Council authorized this action under
Chapter VII. France deployed approximately 2,500 troops in what was known
as 'Opdration Turquoise,' which also included 500 Senegalese troops.es As
Bruce Jones notes, 'the "humanitarian" motivation of the French action is
highly suspect.'e6 France had close ties to the Habyarimana regime. The area
France chose to protect 
- 
the southwestern part of the country 
- 
was essen-
tially devoid of Tutsi, who had either been killed or had fled, although there
were still Hutu there, in particular retreating Rwandan government forces
who had participated in the genocide. Further, French troops received orders
from Paris to prevent the advance of RPF soldiers into the area they con-
trolled.eT Jones arsues that
while the humanitarian element was not absent in French thinking, the
primary objectives were threefold: to secure the northern region of Zaire,
which would have been destabilized by refugee flows; to demonstrate to
an otherwise inactive Security Council that the French were capable of effec-
tively projecting power on the African continent; and, most importantly,
to secure French political objectives by engaging in what could be shown
to be a humanitarian exercise, and thereby downplay the negative pub-
licity of France's support for the Habyarimana regime. Thus, humanitarian
motivations cannot be seen to have 'wholly or primarily' guided French
action.eB
Nevertheless, Opdration Turquoise had significant humanitarian outcomes.
Humanitarian relief efforts were assisted, and 13,000-14,000 people were pro-
tected who otherwise might have been killed.ee
To the extent that refugees were an impetus for intervention, then, the French
were focused primarily on security threats rather than on people in desperate
humanitarian straits.roo Other pronouncements coming out the Security Council
continued to put refugees in the larger context of regional stability. A state-
ment by the President of the Security Council on July 14 noted that:
The Security Council is alarmed by the continuation of fighting in Rwanda,
which is causing massive exodus of the population. This situation may
lead very quickly to a further humanitarian disaster and endanger the
stability of the region, since the flow of these refugees is seriously affecting
the neighbouring countries. ror
Another statement by the President of the Security Council stressed the need
to prevent further population movements, 'which might exacerbate the situa-
tion in neighbouring countries. "o' The President also stated that: 'The Security
Council remains extremely concerned at the plight of the millions of refugees
and displaced persons in Rwanda and the countries of the region. It reiter-
ates its view that their return to their homes is essential for the normalization
of the situation in Rwanda and for the stabilization of the region.'r03
The Security Council might have authorized two kinds of activities to deal
with the refugee crisis 
- 
to stop genocide in the first place and to provide
security for humanitarian activities in months following the genocide. Certainly,
the UN failed to respond to the Rwanda genocide. Instead of pulling out troops,
it could have beefed up their number in an attempt to physically stop the killing.
The success by small numbers of UNAMIR troops left in Rwanda suggest
that many more lives could have been saved by a larger UNAMIR. Once the
genocide was over, however, and Hutus began flowing out of Rwanda, the
issue became how to deal with displaced, both within Rwanda and the
bordering countries, who were fleeing the new Tutsi-led government. One core
issue was insecurity in the refugee camps. Hutu militia members attempted
to exert control over the refugees and threatened violence. The situation was
so bad in some camps that most relief workers left during darkness, and
humanitarian efforts were generally impeded. The same can be said of relief
efforts more generally. NGOs had an easier time in areas controlled by the
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), which eventually became the new govern-
ment, than in those areas controlled by the Hutu militia. There were some
attempts to disarm militia members in some of the camps and in the French
controlled zone, but this was sporadic.roa
There was a significant foreign military presence in Rwanda and neigh-
boring countries in response to the crisis. But, such a presence came very
late and did not address all elements of the crisis, most notably the security
dimension, focusing instead on humanitarian logistical support. Op6ration
Turquoise has already been discussed. Although its success may have been
mixed, it did have capabilities that UNAMIR lacked. In fact, General Dallaire
of UNAMIR remarked that 'Turquoise was everything I wanted it ILINAMIR]
to be.'lo5
The US military further, provided significant logistical support to relief
efforts. However, American support came late and also excluded security
activities in the camps and elsewhere. In light of the experience in Somalia,
as well as Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) of May 1994 which
set out US policy on peacekeeping operations (and which had been informed
by the Somalia experience), the US did not initially perceive a vital national
interest in Rwanda sufficient to warrant intervention.ro6 The US partially
reversed itself at the end of July 1994 as a result of a confluence of factors,
but still would not commit forces for military/security related activities:
The scale of the influx into Goma, the subsequent cholera epidemic and
the intense TV coverage, combined with the ending of the open conflict
between the RPF and FAR, resulted in a policy flip such that it now became
in the US national interest to deploy its military. However, to overcome
reluctance to the foreign deployment of US forces among the US public and
politicians, Operation Support Hope was presented as a strictly humanitarian
operation with no peacekeeping role and, in line with the new PDD 25,
maintaining a clear separation of its command structure from third parties,
including UNAMIR.toT
In a number of instances the Security Council saw that the flow of Rwandan
refugees constituted a 'threat to international peace and security' in the region.
Certainly, an increased number of refugees in Burundi could have inflamed
an already tense situation.r08 Eventually, the genocide was recognized as an
international threat.loe Notwithstanding expressions of concern, however,
almost nothing was done to mitigate the situation. UNAMIR peacekeepers
were initially pulled out rather than reinforced. A small, yet significant,
intervention was eventually undertaken by France two and a half months
into the genocide. While a part of the French motivation had to do with the
security aspects of refugee flows, the major reasons behind the intervention
were domestic political concerns and a desire to protect its former allies, the
Hutu.
Except for France, permanent members of the Security Council had no direct
stake in Rwanda. This must be placed in the context of disengagement from
Africa after the Cold War. With no strategic or other interests in the region,
it was relatively easy for Western governments to allow genocide to continue
and millions of people to become displaced. Given the relatively quick time
frame in which the coup, genocide, and eventual takeover by the Rwandese
Patriotic Front (members of the former Tutsi government) occurred, the public
pressure which built up in the case of Somalia over time did not occur
concerning Rwanda.rro In addition, there was little danger of significant
numbers of Rwandan refugees showing up on the shores of the US, UK or
other Western countries. In general, they stayed in the immediate region, mostly
Zaire, Tanzania, Burundi, and Uganda.
As opposed to Haiti or Bosnia, there was little intersection between
Rwandan refugees and ongoing debates about immigration, and thus no impetus
to undertake an intervention to prevent refugees from coming ashore or, as
with the former Yugoslavia, to pursue other policies which emphasized the
'right to remain.' Even the displacement of 3 million people in and from
Rwanda did not have a significant effect on Western countries, and thus was
largely ignored until a new balance of power emerged that halted the killing.
Intervention in refugee situations
Civil wars, communal conflicts, genocides, and other humanitarian emergen-
cies in the emerging global order all generate large numbers of refugees and
other displaced persons. Such large displacements can have significant
international repercussions as well as immediate humanitarian implications for
those in flight. While this global problem is recognized, the United Nations
- 
the single global body with responsibilities for responding to both threats
to international stability and humanitarian emergencies 
- 
has been reluctant
to address these problems. The UN has not addressed these issues in a forth-
right, coherent, and principled manner, and has many instances of humanitarian
crises.
The civil war in the Sudan constitutes a dramatic humanitarian emergency.
Between the start the most recent civil war in 1983 through 1993, approxi-
mately 1.3 million people in southern Sudan died as a result of war, government
policies, and war-related famine and disease.rrr At the end of 1994, 510,000
Sudanese were refugees, primarily in Zaire and Uganda and other neigh-
boring countries, and 4 million Sudanese were displaced within the country.rr2
This vast humanitarian disaster also had security implications for other states
in the region, particularly as fighting from the civil war spills over into other
countries as combatants blend with larger refugee migrations.rt' However,
the Sudan largely has been ignored by world media; beyond some partially
successful attempts to relieve some of the suffering,rra the IIN has done little
to stop fighting and address security issues.
Only in a few instances has the Security Council deemed mass displace-
ment worthy of its sustained attention, and even then, involvement has been
haphazard, incoherent, and ambiguous. Can we discern any common threads
among these cases? Also, what are the implications for further discourse about,
and instances of, humanitarian intervention? That is, have international actions
created precedents for an emerging global order?
Each case involved different interests and actors, each had their own(il)logic, and refugees affected each crisis in different ways. In Iraq, the
presence of refugees on the border with Turkey, combined with a NATO ally
with an interest in further punishing Iraq, plus significant media coverage of
the plight of the Kurds, led to one of the few instances of intervention with
a significantly positive humanitarian outcome. It was also a very clear case
where a country's sovereignty was violated for humanitarian purposes. Whether
the motivations were actually humanitarian is much less clear, and thus it
remains to be seen whether it can actually be called a humanitarian inter-
vention, since humanitarian motives must play some role in the intervention.
Refugees did play the most significant role in the eventual intervention. Yet,
their construction as a 'threal to international peace and security' seemed at
the forefront in resolution 688 and other debates rather than displaced persons
in dire need of assistance. Further, without the particular US strategic inter-
ests and involvement, it is questionable whether or not the intervention would
have happened as quickly, or at all.
Somalia illustrates what happens when those interests are absent. There were
refugee flows and other humanitarian problems in Somalia. However, refugees
were never mentioned in the Security Council resolutions. While there were
aid agencies operating in Somalia, they had avery diffrcult time gaining access
to affected populations. It took the UN many months to provide the enforce-
ment mandate needed to ensure unimpeded movement of humanitarian
convoys. This only came after an American offer to intervene which, resulted
from significant public pressure spurred by media attention 
- 
the CNN effect.
This seems to indicate that US or Western interest, absent any compelling
strategic interests, can occur only through almost random media focus which
may yield public pressure to address the situation. This bodes poorly for
coherent responses to humanitarian disasters. Yet, the power of media does
suggest an interesting mechanism for global public pressure to act in human-
itarian crises.
Refugees, per se, did not seem to be a significant factor leading to inter-
vention. Kenya and Ethiopia, to which most Somali fled, were victims of
the end of the Cold War; Western attention moved from the 'Third World'
as a venue for superpower competition towards other parts of the world where
economic interests predominate. Unlike Turkey which had NATO allies,
countries in the region had no powerful allies on which to call to ensure that
real security issues associated with refugee flows were prominent on the UN
agenda. Rather, when the intervention came, it was put in general terms of
humanitarianism, of which refugees were but one part.
Haiti is the clearest case to date where refugee flows became a signifi-
cant security issue for a permanent member of the UN Security Council,
leading to large scale, if belated, intervention. Part of the US reaction to the
Haiti crisis was related to the domestic political context, where a backlash
against immigration created pressure to tighten US borders and exclude people,
including refugees.
The former Yugoslavia is the most complex case, involving secession, ethnic
conflict, genocide and other human rights abuses, any one of which could
produce refugees. Added to this is an indecisive international community,
including the Security Council, which passed 91 resolutions related to the
former Yugoslavia in five years with little effect. However, hundreds of
thousands of refugees fleeing to Western Europe, and the potential for many
more as during the Haitian crisis, demanded politicians' attention. Such refugee
flows when combined with domestic debates over immigration and the larger
context of the European Union development and immigration harmonization,
led to an interest in preventing more refugees from fleeing. Thus, the UN
moved toward ensuring the right to remain by declaring 'safe areas' 
- 
rhetor-
ically, if not in fact. That Security Council resolutions rarely mentioned
refugees does not mean that they were not a consideration. Fear of many
more new refugees, indeed, led to the creation of so-called'safe areas.'
Finally, in Rwanda, the Security Council definitely saw refugees in the
context of regional stability. Yet, because the Rwandan people and surrounding
countries had no powerful allies, no forceful action was undertaken to stop
the genocide and prevent regional destabilization which could result from
refugee flows. When the French did finally act, it had more to do with its
ties to the Habyarimana regime than humanitarianism or a concern with the
effects of refugee flows.
Conclusion
Action to stop refugee flows, this analysis suggests, will only occur when a
great power has an interest in the situation and sees refugees as a security
threat. Even then, forceful action through the Security Council probably will
not occur right away.
However, other questions and implications arise. First, to what extent can
security issues, refugees, and human rights abuses be disentangled from each
other? Clearly, these different elements are related. Human rights abuses can
cause refugee flows which create burdens and even significant security threats
in other countries. Insecurity and widespread violence can lead to displace-
ment which spreads insecurity across state boundaries. Insecurity can also lead
to governmental oppression as they try to shore up their hold on power,
which can bring targeted individuals or groups to flee, spreading further
insecurity. Even when the displaced do not cross borders, grave humanitarian
conditions in one country can contribute to regional stress.
Little improvement in the potential for mass refugee migration can be gained
by addressing one of the three principal factors. All must be addressed simul-
taneously. For example, states may see the need to address a human rights
situation to achieve their ultimate goal of preventing a refugee influx which
they see as a security threat. In northern Iraq, Turkey saw a significant security
threat from 400,000 Kurds. In order to combat this perceived danger, some
of its allies engaged in protection activities which temporarily stopped human
rights threats to Kurds from Baghdad.rr5 In Haiti, the US perceived a security
threat from the tens of thousands of Haitians attempting to flee to the US. After
intercepting them at sea, it finally intervened and reinstalled the democrati-
cally elected leader who it had earlier found distasteful; security issues (and
domestic politics) finally overrode objections to intervention. Or, as in the case
of the former Yugoslavia, countries may give lip service to addressing human
rights abuses while doing little more than giving rhetorical support for 'safe
areas.'
Finally, it may be that humanitarian concerns are paramount and refugees
are seen as part of an overall humanitarian disaster. This was so in Somalia,
where those who intervened had little interest in the security issues of the
region, but, faced public pressure to address the humanitarian dimension.
But, not addressing issues of security within the country 
- 
for example,
disarming all sides in the conflict in a sustained and comprehensive manner
- 
the likelihood remains for further humanitarian degradation and more dis-
placement.
The cases of Iraqi Kurdistan, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia all point
to the crisis of asylum and 'the breakdown of the consensus on which the
international refugee system was built.'rr6 The implications for this are
profound. If, as seems likely, the domestic political trends with regard to
immigration continue, governments will be looking for new ways to keep
victims of persecution and generalized violence from becoming refugees 
- 
that
is, reaching and crossing their borders. Besides just attempting to close borders
and retuming refugees without asylum hearings, they will probably also resort
to so-called in-country 'protection' and 'safe areas,' although these schemes
frequently have little protective value. When these strategies fail, states may
resofl to interventions which, to varying degrees, address humanitarian crises
and the root causes of situations that lead people to become refugees. Such
interventions will probably continue to be haphazard and, for the foresee-
able future, will not contribute to a more coherent regime of humanitarian
intervention.
Recent instances of intervention have set precedents for action by the
Security Council. In four of the five cases (all but Somalia), refugees were
mentioned by Security Council resolutions, although they were substantially
less prominent in resolutions related to the former Yugoslavia than for other
countries. The most explicit link between refugee flows and security was
resolution 688, which referred to the 'massive flow of refugees towards and
across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions. which threaten
international peace and security.' This link was not made in the case of the
former Yugoslavia. In the other cases, the connection between displacement
and security was made with varying degrees of explicitness. Refugees con-
ceptualized as those in need of assistance and the wider humanitarian context
were also prominent in many of these resolutions. For example, resolution 794
which legitimated the US intervention in Somalia set forth international security
as a context for the action in the preamble, but went on to focus on the
general humanitarian situation and the necessity of providing humanitarian
assistance; refugees were never mentioned in this or in any resolution leading
up to it.
Thus, in the recent instances where the Security Council has called for
forceful intervention, the presence of refugees and potential has played varying,
but important, roles. This includes being both direct threats to international
peace and security, as well as part of a larger, perilous humanitarian situa-
tion, that can become a security threat. Because the phrase 'threat to
international peace and security' is used in the UN Charter, it is reasonable
that it would appear in Security Council resolutions. However, this language
is now being applied in a wider variety of situations and suggests changing
perceptions regarding what constitute security threats. The more frequent use
of such a phrase by the Security Council also indicates that evolving per-
spectives on human rights and humanitarian issues are impacting security
discourses, as well as being forced within the narrow confines of the UN
Charter. While concrete transboundary effects of humanitarian crises increas-
ingly are being recognized, normative dimensions of changing notions of
human rights and sovereignty are not being recognized. Interests and motives
of those who intervene and those who support intervention run the gamut from
national security and domestic politics to humanitarianism. But, while human-
itarianism became a permanent feature of Security Council resolutions, these
cases demonstrate that intervention is still not 'justified' solely on humani-
tarian grounds.
The discourse over humanitarian intervention has expanded dramatically, as
the end of the Cold War made more things possible in the intemational arena
and as more emphasis was placed on humanitarian crises.il7 Fundamental
questions thus require our attention, to which this essay has sought prelimi-
nary answers: Can humanitarian intervention truly be humanitarian? Can UN
action be severed from the national interest of the US and other great powers?
What do these interventions say about the will of the international commu-
nity to fundamentally address the causes and consequences of humanitarian
crises? This investigation suggests that questions of security, national interest,
and humanitarianism are inextricably linked. All humanitarian emergencies
have transboundary implications, particularly in the form of refugees. They are
thus constructed as security threats which may incite or inflame conflict
directly, or may strain local resources to the extent that instability is gener-
ated. Refugees themselves 
- 
as a particular group in need of aid or an
amorphous humanitarian crisis which can draw the world's attention 
- 
can
be catalysts for intervention. Generally, the plight of refugees or a humani-
tarian disaster per se have not triggered intervention outside broader contexts
of security and national interest. National interest can, as a result of public
outcry include humanitarianism 
- 
but such sentiment is fickle and is not a
reliable catalyst for humanitarian action.
The international response to refugee crises has thus been incoherent. In
an era when the landscape of global politics is changing, new possibilities
are opening up, and interests are being reconstructed, blatant power politics
and pure self-interest on the part of powerfirl countries remain evident. Yet,
the international effects of communal conflict and human rights abuses,
including the refugee situations they create, are now recognized and are
prominent in international debate. The Security Council 
- 
the ultimate arbiter
of what counts as the most globally relevant 
- 
has placed these issues on its
permanent agenda and has started to create precedents for dealing with them.
The results are uneven and contradictory, and the issues have not been
framed in the most direct way. But, the precedents are there. Whether or not
these precedents will be applied in an even and coherent manner, given recent
practice, is a matter for considerable skepticism.
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